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STRENGTH IN NuMBERS The RemaRkable PoTeNTial of (Really) Small 
CombaTaNTS
Jimmy Drennan
you are a tactical commander tasked with a mission to seek out and destroy one 
of the enemy’s premier capital ships in his home waters. you have two potential 
striking forces at your disposal: a world-class surface combatant of your own with 
a 99 percent probability of mission success (Ps = 0.99) or a squadron of eight in-
dependently operating, missile-carrying small combatants, each with a chance of 
successfully completing the mission no better than a coin flip (Ps = 0.5). do you 
go with the almost sure thing and choose to send in your large combatant? as it 
turns out, the squadron of small combatants has an even higher overall Ps but let 
us now assume that you have advanced to operational commander. you might 
have more concerns than just overall Ps. What are the defensive and logistical 
requirements for each option? How much fleet investment are you risking with 
each option? What will it cost to replace the asset(s) if lost? What capability does 
the striking force have after successful enemy action (i.e., resilience)? an analy-
sis of these factors, intentionally designed to disadvantage small combatants, is 
actually overwhelmingly in their favor. the results verify what naval strategists 
and tacticians have long known—that for certain offensive missions, an indepen-
dently operating group of even marginally capable platforms can outperform a 
single large combatant at lower cost and less risk to the mission.
THe war-aT-Sea FloTilla: a TeST caSe 
retired U.s. Navy captains Jeff Kline and Wayne Hughes introduced “between 
Peace and the air-sea battle: a War at sea strategy,” in which they describe a flo-
tilla of small, missile-carrying surface combatants designed to challenge Chinese 
aggression in east asian waters.1 the flotilla ships would utilize largely indepen-
dent tactics that relied little on networked command and control, to produce a 
powerful cumulative combat capability.
What would the flotilla look like? In rough terms, 
we envision individual small combatants of about 
six hundred tons carrying six or eight surface-
to-surface missiles and depending on soft kill 
and point defense for survival, aided by offboard 
manned or unmanned aerial vehicles for surveil-
lance and tactical scouting. to paint a picture of 
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possible structures, we contemplate as the smallest element a mutually supporting 
pair, a squadron to comprise eight vessels, and the entire force to be eight squadrons, 
of which half would be in east asian waters. the units costing less than $100 million 
each, the entire force would require a very small part of the shipbuilding budget.2 
this flotilla concept provides an ideal test case to compare against a world-class 
surface combatant, but first we must establish a few key assumptions on which 
this analysis is based.
Statistical independence. the math behind this analysis hinges on the idea that 
the outcome of one small combatant’s engagement has no effect on the others in 
the squadron. While true statistical independence is nearly impossible to achieve 
in real-world naval operations, the “war-at-sea flotilla” concept is modeled close-
ly with independently operating units, the potential for various ship classes, and 
the inclusion of allied navies, which may use different tactics, techniques, and 
procedures (ttPs). this concept of operations is a major departure from today’s 
heavily networked forces that generate combat power through the integrated ac-
tions of several units. In those forces, the actions of one unit can have profound 
impact on the effectiveness of another. 
Defensive and Logistical Requirements. for the purposes of this analysis, we will 
assume that the defensive and logistical requirements are roughly equivalent for 
both the small combatant squadron and the large combatant. both would require 
defensive support in warfare areas not directly related to the current mission. 
even a multimission, blue-water combatant would employ nonorganic support, 
such as maritime patrol aircraft or early-warning assets, to watch its back while 
conducting a focused offensive mission. as for logistics, any surface asset would 
need an oiler nearby to conduct sustained operations in enemy waters. a nuclear- 
powered aircraft carrier would still require periodic support to replenish its stores 
of jet fuel. the logistics tail would be shorter for a large combatant than for a flo-
tilla, since it carries much of its own maintenance and supply support, but that 
can be a detriment in a mission involving an exchange of missile salvos. While 
the structure of defensive and logistical support may differ greatly between the 
flotilla and the large combatant, one can assume the drain on resources would be 
about the same for both options.
Unit Cost. Hughes and Kline estimate the unit cost of the flotilla small combat-
ants to be at eighty million dollars. therefore, a squadron of eight combatants 
would cost $640 million. the unit cost of the large combatant is assumed to be a 
billion dollars, which is an underestimate for relevant U.s. Navy platforms. the 
cost estimates in this analysis are intentionally set up to work against the flotilla 
concept in order to emphasize its potential for savings.
2
Naval War College Review, Vol. 67 [2014], No. 1, Art. 10
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol67/iss1/10
 d r e N Na N  1 2 7
Enemy Capabilities. to disadvantage further the flotilla concept, let us assume 
the small combatants are significantly overmatched by the enemy combatant. In 
a first strike, the enemy combatant is capable of simultaneously targeting six of 
the eight squadron combatants. against the large combatant, it is capable of con-
ducting a devastating mission kill in which the ship may not be sunk but the cost 
of repairing it to full mission capability would be comparable to the unit cost. as 
a starting argument, we will presume in either case the enemy can achieve a mis-
sion kill with 10 percent probability (Pmk = 0.10), since both striking forces have 
similar levels of defensive support. one might argue that Pmk should be lower 
for the large combatant, because it possesses superior self-defense capabilities; 
however, it could also be argued that the mobile, distributed nature of the small-
combatant squadron compensates for each ship’s lack of self-defense by compli-
cating the enemy’s targeting process. It may be relatively easy for the enemy to 
target one or two of the small combatants, but it remains a challenge to eliminate 
at one stroke the entire squadron. 
SelecTing THe rigHT STriKing Force: analYSiS reSUlTS
Using the generic introductory scenario, we can compare the small combatant 
squadron with the large combatant in terms of performance, cost, and risk.
Overall Effectiveness. We are given the overall effectiveness of the large combat-
ant as Ps = 0.99 and the individual effectiveness of the small combatants as Ps,ship = 
0.5. to determine the overall effectiveness of the squadron, it is easiest to first es-
timate the probability that none of the small combatants successfully accomplish 
their mission. the probability that any one small combatant will not accomplish 
the mission is
1 − Ps,ship = 0.5.
since the outcome of each engagement is estimated as independent of one 
another, the probability that none of the eight small combatants accomplish the 
mission is
(1 − Ps,ship)8 = 0.004.
the probability that at least one of the small combatants accomplishes the 
mission is the converse of the previous result, or 
1 − (1 − Ps,ship)8 = 0.996.
In other words, the squadron has a 99.6 percent probability of success vice 99 
percent for the large combatant. this may not seem like much of an improve-
ment, but it is more remarkable when considering the unit cost of each option.
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Cost-Effectiveness. the unit costs are given as one billion dollars for the large 
combatant and eighty million for the small combatant, so the squadron of eight 
small combatants is the more affordable option, at $640 million. In addition, it 
has been established that the squadron can outperform the large combatant for 
this particular offensive mission, in which the individual squadron ships are ac-
tually overmatched by the enemy. the squadron not only is more cost-effective 
than the large combatant but actually delivers better performance at lower cost. 
as a commander, would you rather invest a billion dollars in a striking force 
that fails ten times in a thousand attempts or save $360 million with a striking 
force that fails only four times in a thousand attempts? to put it another way, 
if you were to invest the same billion dollars in twelve small combatants, you 
could deliver a striking force that failed only two times in ten thousand attempts 
(Ps = 0.9998).
Resilience after Enemy action. one way to consider risk is to look at the impact 
to the mission if the enemy is able to consummate successfully a first attack. We 
have assumed the enemy is equally capable of attacking the large combatant and 
the squadron of small combatants. If the enemy combatant achieves a simulta-
neous mission kill against six of the small combatants, only two will remain to 
continue the mission. these two small combatants have a combined 75 percent 
probability of successfully completing the mission. on the other hand, if the en-
emy successfully conducts a mission kill against the large combatant, the prob-
ability of successfully completing the mission is 0 percent, and you lose the other 
warfare-area capabilities that the large combatant could bring to bear in other 
missions. the additional investment required to provide onboard logistics sup-
port is also lost.
another way to look at this risk is to calculate the expected damage cost of 
each option in the long run. assuming the enemy is able to conduct devastating 
mission kills (in which the repair costs are comparable to the unit cost) a conser-
vative 10 percent of the time (Pmk = 0.1) for both the large and small combatants, 
then the expected damage cost for the large combatant is
e(cost)large = (0.1)($1b) = $100 million.
likewise, the expected damage cost for the squadron of small combatants is 
e(cost)squadron = (0.1)($80M · 6) = $48 million.
In the long run, the enemy is expected to cause fifty-two million dollars less 
damage per mission in the case of the small combatants. even if the enemy were 
more likely to succeed in targeting six small combatants simultaneously, how 
much would you as a commander be willing to pay for 75 percent follow-on 
capability vice 0 percent?
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leSS coMMUnicaTionS, leSS coST, More coMBaT Power: 
analYSiS inSigHTS
the results of this analysis seem to indicate that the squadron of small combat-
ants is an obvious choice for naval missions involving direct action against the 
enemy fleet. yet the scenario described is quite generic and says nothing about 
the actual ttPs and systems the squadron will utilize in prosecuting the enemy. 
How can such a generic scenario really prove anything about the effectiveness 
of small combatants? the key is that two fundamental principles underlie this 
analysis and can be applied in much broader terms.
first, independently operating, redundant, and at least marginally capable 
units will greatly increase any system’s overall effectiveness, primarily because 
unit faults and errors are not permitted to propagate through the system as they 
would in net-centric warfare (e.g., flawed group tactics or a false link track). 
for surface combatants, an individual effectiveness of 50 percent is sufficient to 
produce affordably a formidable striking force. for less expensive systems, that 
number may be even less. Ultimately, this kind of system is so effective because 
it is highly unlikely that none of the individual units will successfully complete 
the mission.
the second principle that contributes to the appeal of the small combatant 
squadron is that the price of military systems increases exponentially as you 
attempt to improve individual unit performance closer and closer to perfec-
tion. Most of our warships today are designed well past the “knee” in the cost 
curve. small combatants can be built with marginal capability at (relatively) low 
cost. one new concept illustrates how less-capable ships can affordably produce 
equivalent performance to that of more capable ones in certain situations. In his 
essay “buy fords, Not ferraris,” Captain Henry Hendrix, UsN, proposes “influ-
ence squadrons,” composed of light amphibious ships, large combatants, littoral 
combat ships (lCss), and small combatants, to alleviate the need for some carrier 
strike groups, with a smaller price tag.3 the purpose of the war-at-sea flotilla, 
however, is not to replace current fleet assets but to fill a vital niche not now 
covered to fight a war at sea in littoral waters. therefore, the cost must be small. 
Hughes and Kline suggest the cost of maintaining a fleet of sixty-four flotilla 
ships, steady state, should be less than 3 or 4 percent of the shipbuilding budget.4
THinK SMall: analYSiS conclUSion anD recoMMenDaTionS
one look at the writings of sir Julian Corbett or Captain Hughes’s Fleet Tactics 
and coastal combat will show the reader that the benefit of small combatants in 
certain aspects of naval warfare is not a new discovery.5 In fact, this analysis may 
seem like the kind of thinking that led to the development of the lCs, which was, 
after all, war gaming and analysis that advocated small combatants.6 the lCs 
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program is not, however, a realization of the principles discussed in this analysis. 
both Freedom- and independence-class lCss are large, multimission warships (al-
beit one mission at a time) in which mission packages cost a premium to achieve 
high probabilities of success. the war-at-sea flotilla, if constructed as Hughes and 
Kline recommend, would exemplify the advantages of independently operating 
small combatants.
None of this is meant to condemn the lCs or any other ship class. every ship 
in the U.s. fleet, along with the distributed networks that multiply its combat 
power, has an important role in the mission of winning the nation’s wars, deter-
ring aggression, and maintaining freedom of the seas. the purpose here is to 
provide an analytical basis for including independently operating squadrons of 
small combatants in the discussion for future force structure. for targeted offen-
sive missions at sea, concepts such as the war-at-sea flotilla can provide higher 
performance than large combatants at lower cost and with greater resilience 
with respect to enemy action. In today’s fiscal reality and tomorrow’s projected 
operational environment, that is a combination Navy leaders should not ignore.
DeBaTing THe war-aT-Sea FloTilla: analYSiS criTiciSM 
anD reSPonSe 
When this article originally appeared on the blog information Dissemination in 
april 2013, it generated intense debate on various discussion boards. the fol-
lowing is a representative sample of the most common composite criticisms of 
the war-at-sea-flotilla concept and associated analysis. Not included here are the 
comments that focused on the merits of the war-at-sea strategy itself. although 
this analysis is intended to support the war-at-sea strategy, it is not meant to be its 
defense. other, more effective strategic options may certainly exist. the merits of 
Hughes and Kline’s work are taken at face value for the purposes of this analysis. 
this article analyzes the tactical implications in a very focused and basic scenario 
to show that a squadron of small combatants, which do not exist in today’s fleet 
inventory, could be more effective than a large combatant in certain offensive 
missions against an enemy fleet.
The analysis is fine as far as it goes; however, like Hughes’s work, it considers the 
engagement in isolation. Today’s militaries, including the obvious target of china, 
fight in a combined-arms environment. For instance, the impact of airpower is 
ignored. Small combatants are extremely vulnerable to aircraft and would be sus-
ceptible to defeat in detail long before reaching engagement range. 
the impacts of combined arms and supporting assets, from both the en-
emy and friendly perspectives, are actually embedded in this analysis. on the 
6
Naval War College Review, Vol. 67 [2014], No. 1, Art. 10
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol67/iss1/10
 d r e N Na N  1 3 1
offensive side, the type of attack need not be specified. although antiship cruise 
missiles are the obvious choice, deception tactics used to get close to the enemy 
combined with a single torpedo may also be very effective. on the defensive 
side, both the large and small combatants would require area-defense support 
(in all warfare areas). Certainly the large combatant would be more capable of 
self-defense but, in the case of an aegis-equipped destroyer/cruiser, it is exactly 
this added defensive capability (in addition to other warfare capabilities, such as 
ballistic-missile defense and antisubmarine warfare) that requires area-defense 
support. as a commander, would you risk losing an aegis combatant by sending 
it on an offensive mission in hostile territory alone and unafraid? as for the en-
emy, any supporting capabilities that can be brought to bear on the striking force 
are accounted for in the intentionally generalized probability of mission success 
(Ps). the individual small combatant only succeeds half the time (Ps = 0.5), not 
just because of its own limitations, but also because of the enemy’s capabilities. 
a larger combatant, such as an arleigh burke–class guided-missile destroyer, 
would have a better chance of survival to engagement. 
granted, the large combatant may be more capable of preventing missile im-
pact (although small combatants have an inherent stealth advantage and soft-kill 
techniques continue to level the playing field), but even if the small combatants 
were much more likely to take missile hits, the resilient capability of the overall 
squadron may very well be worth the premium paid in damage costs.
How do you convince the american public that people who join the navy are to 
serve on ships that we know will die fast in a war? Do you tell them that it is cost-
effective to lose six of eight ships, as long as they kill one of the enemy’s? 
Consider which is worse: a large combatant goes toe to toe with an enemy 
combatant, takes a devastating missile salvo that kills a significant portion of 
its crew, and gets put out of the fight for months with extreme damage repairs 
while the enemy continues on its way; or a squadron of eight small combatants 
loses six ships but manages to accomplish the mission with the remaining two by 
destroying the enemy combatant. these are not “ships designed to lose”; this is a 
squadron, and therefore a Navy, designed to win.
These small ships must rely on networks to be effective. what happens when the 
chinese jam/spoof U.S. networks on the opening day of conflict? 
It is precisely the opposite that makes the war-at-sea flotilla so effective. since 
the flotilla ships are not connected in a network, their operations can be consid-
ered independent, which leads to the high overall Ps described in this analysis. 
7
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It is the independent nature of the small combatants from which the squadron 
derives its power. In fact, the lack of an elaborate network reduces the flotilla’s 
electromagnetic signature, further increasing its combat effectiveness by making 
it harder to detect.
i just don’t see eighty million dollars being the price per unit at the end of the day. 
a common criticism was that eighty million dollars is a gross underestimate 
for a small combatant. even if the estimate were off by 100 percent and the actual 
unit cost were $160 million, the entire squadron of eight ships would cost $1.28 
billion—still less than an arleigh Burke guided-missile destroyer. for argument’s 
sake, assume the costs were equal. at that point, the squadron would yield higher 
effectiveness and more resilience for the same price (for the particular mission 
in question). 
Surface combatants serve as a mobile base for maritime helicopters and increasingly 
capable vertical-takeoff unmanned aerial vehicles. a large helicopter deck and han-
gar are arguably the primary strengths of a modern surface combatant. Yet nowhere 
does one see that the author’s proposed “eighty-million-dollar small combatant” 
would be capable of supporting a “helo” or even a Fire Scout. 
While this is certainly a narrow view of surface warfare, it is often valid in to-
day’s operations. the war-at-sea flotilla, however, is predicated on the notion that 
at some point in the future the U.s. Navy will be called on to conduct offensive 
operations against modern enemy combatants at sea. the primary strength of the 
small combatants described here would be their ability to launch a devastating 
salvo of next-generation cruise missiles. If an organic air asset were deemed to 
be absolutely mission critical, unit cost would certainly increase, but it would not 
invalidate the concept (refer to the unit-cost criticism above).
if we are focused on launching cruise missiles better, we can do it better and 
cheaper from a dedicated navy ship. Drones can provide comparable endurance, 
less cost and risk, and larger launch envelopes. an international organization for 
Standardization–sized container of cruise missiles could be put on any allied ship with 
a navy team and become another launch node. letters of marque could be issued, and 
this same modular payload could be operated by navy technicians on eager Philippine 
and vietnamese ships. if we take the chief of naval operations’ direction to heart— 
payloads over platforms—we really just need a box of missiles and need to focus on 
the Pmk of the missile. 
drones and converted containerships are both intriguing ideas for potential 
launch platforms, although each has its drawbacks. achieving persistent presence 
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with land-based drones comparable to that provided by a flotilla may be a chal-
lenge, whereas naval drones are simply extensions of ships, which brings the 
discussion back to large versus small combatants. Containerships could cer-
tainly be inexpensive alternatives to purpose-built combatants, but the rules of 
engagement and political challenges to the use of neutral shipping as a cover to 
engage the enemy may be too great to overcome. Nevertheless, both ideas speak 
to the heart of this analysis: it is not really about small ships but about redundant 
systems of inexpensive nodes operating independently to produce impressive 
combat effectiveness.
Smaller ships need a logistics force to support their operations or an advanced base 
from which to operate close to the chinese coast. 
all ships need logistics forces to support their operations. the logistical re-
quirements of a flotilla of small ships are only more pronounced, because the 
ships carry fewer organic logistical capabilities on board than do large combat-
ants. However, the added logistical capabilities of large combatants can be a li-
ability in open hostilities, because more personnel and resources in the overall 
supply chain are lost when the ship takes damage. When a small combatant is hit 
by the enemy, the overall supply chain is barely affected. 
Doesn’t the U.S. navy already have a small, eighty-million-dollar antiship platform 
in the guise of the F/a-18e/F Super Hornet? 
the comparison to naval aviation might be compelling, except that a naval 
tactical aircraft has to launch from an aircraft carrier, which would be the rel-
evant unit to compare against the squadron of small combatants. the tactical 
range of the f-18 does not allow for the argument that the carrier itself would not 
be involved in the engagement. even if the carrier’s probability of success were 
99.999 percent, the expected damage cost in the long term (in both financial and 
strategic terms) would be prohibitive.
This type of analysis, essentially identical to Hughes’s approach, is extremely sim-
plistic, so much so that meaningful conclusions cannot be drawn. in fact, the results 
can be misleading if the limitations are not clearly recognized. 
simple analyses can produce valuable insights that can be developed into inte-
grated courses of action. of course, strategy is not the summation of tactics, but it 
is important to start simple, or else one is left with a Navy that goes nowhere—or 
worse, a Navy that does not understand where it is going.
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n o T e S
the essay on which the present essay is  
based was originally posted on the website 
information Dissemination, at www 
.informationdissemination.net/2013/04/
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